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#2A-8/14/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF NEWBURGH, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-10589 
-and-
LOCAL 589, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF FIREFIGHTERS, 
Respondent. 
HITSMAN, HOFFMAN & O'REILLY (JOHN F. O'REILLY of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
DeSOYE & REICH, ESQS. (THOMAS F. DeSOYE and FREDERICK 
K. REICH of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The City of Newburgh (City) excepts to an Administrative Law 
Judge's (ALT) dismissal of its charge against Local 589, 
International Association of Firefighters (Association) which 
alleges that the Association violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act by agreeing to a provision in the 
parties' 1988-89 contract which it never intended to honor and 
later repudiated. 
The provision in issue is Article IV, §A which provides that 
any unit employee on a civil service eligible list for promotion 
must accept the City's assignment to a temporary or acting higher 
level position or the employee, on refusal, must remove his or 
her name from that promotion list. 
The ALJ held that the Association had no duty to disclose 
its doubts about the legality of Article IV, §A and that the 
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stipulated record otherwise did not establish either that the 
Association lacked an intention to enter into a binding contract 
or that it repudiated its agreement. 
The City's exceptions are directed to each of the ALJ's 
conclusions of law. It argues that the Association's intention 
to dishonor the agreement is established by its failure during 
negotiations to disclose to the City its doubts regarding the 
legality of Article IV, §A, and its contemporaneous repudiation 
of that agreement, which is also pleaded as a separate basis for 
violation. The Association allegedly repudiated the agreement by 
causing unit employees* noncompliance and by sending certain 
letters to the local civil service commission soon after the 
) contract was executed on August 23, 1988. The Association's 
attorney wrote to the local commission after the first employee 
had been instructed by the City to remove his name from the civil 
service eligible list. His letter bears the same date as the one 
sent to the local commission by that employee which questions the 
legality of the City's requirement. The first letter, dated 
September 1, 1988, refers to an opinion the Association's 
attorney had obtained from the New York State Civil Service 
Commission. The attorney's letter requests the local 
commission's reaction to the State Commission's opinion that an 
individual cannot be removed from an eligible list under the 
cited circumstances. The second letter, dated September 28, 
1988, represents another affected employee's belief regarding the 
j validity of Article IV, §A and concludes with the stated 
assumption that the employee's name would not be stricken from 
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the eligible list. A third letter, dated October 5, 1988, and 
written on behalf of three other unit employees, is to the same 
effect as the second. 
In late October 1988, the local civil service commission 
informed the City's attorney that Article IV, §A was in conflict 
with the State Civil Service Law and the local commission's; rules 
and it refused to remove the employees' names from the eligible 
list. 
The Association argues in response to the City's exceptions 
that the ALJ's dismissal of the charge was warranted, if not 
compelled, on the stipulated record before him. In its cross-
exceptions, it alleges that the ALT erred by not addressing 
certain of its affirmative defenses, by refusing to consider the 
record on an appeal to the Appellate Division, Third Department 
in a related court case,-!/
 an(j by declining to defer his 
determination pending a final judicial decision on the legality 
of Article IV, §A. 
With respect to the Association's admitted failure to 
disclose its doubts regarding the legality of Article IV, §A, it 
is unclear to us whether the City alleged this failure as an 
•^ /The City commenced a declaratory judgment action after the 
local civil service commission refused to remove the names of the 
unit employees who had refused to accept acting or temporary 
assignments, naming the Association, the affected fire fighters 
and the local civil service commission as parties. . Supreme 
Court, Orange County held Article IV, §A to be valid and 
enforceable, but, on appeal by the Association, the Appellate 
Division unanimously reversed, and declared the clause void as 
contrary to the imperative provisions of Civil Service Law 
§61(2). City of Newburah v. Potter, A.D.2d (3d Dep't 
1990). The City has filed a motion with the Appellate Division 
for permission to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. 
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independent violation. It appears that the City uses the failure 
to disclose only to support its repudiation theory or its 
allegation that the Association never intended to be bound by the 
terms of Article IV, §A. To the extent that the City may be 
alleging that the failure to disclose its doubts is an 
independent act of impropriety, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal. 
Although a failure or refusal to disclose information which may 
reasonably have a material effect on the conduct of negotiations 
may violate the Act under some circumstances,-^ the Association 
was under no duty to disclose its concerns regarding the legality 
of the City's proposal because the City's attorney and its other 
representatives were equally able to make their own assessment. 
I Whatever information there was which caused the Association to 
have doubts regarding the legality of the City's proposal, it was 
not uniquely in the Association's exclusive possession. 
We are also not persuaded by the merits of the City's 
repudiation theory on the law and the facts and affirm the ALJ's 
findings and conclusions in these respects. It is not a refusal 
to negotiate per se for a party to initiate or support a 
challenge to the legality of a negotiated agreement.^/ 
Factually, the stipulated record does not show that the 
^See New York City Transit Auth. and Manhattan & Bronx 
Surface Transit Operating Auth. , 15 PERB f3129 (1982) (employer's 
failure to disclose contemplated layoffs). 
^/s_ee Salmon River Cent. School Dist. , 13 PERB 5[4591 (1980) . 
The Director there dismissed a charge which alleged that the 
employer initiated a court proceeding to stay arbitration after 
agreeing to resolve the issue under the contractual grievance 
procedure because it did not state a violation of the Act as a 
matter of law. 
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Association caused any unit employees to refuse to comply with 
the terms of Article IV, §A. Indeed, the employees who refused 
the acting or temporary assignments did what the contract 
minimally required when they requested the local civil service 
commission to remove their names from the civil service eligible 
1ist - In this respect, the record evidences a union responding 
to the actions of its unit employees, not one causing them to 
act. The ALT read the attorney's letters to the local civil 
service commission as reflecting only the attorney's inquiry 
regarding the local commission's intentions to strike the 
employees' names from the eligible list. The timing and content 
of the letters previously summarized support the ALJ's 
interpretation. 
There is more merit to the City's remaining allegation that 
the totality of the Association's conduct establishes a violation 
of its duty to negotiate in good faith resting upon an intention 
from inception to dishonor Article IV, §A. 
We believe that a party fails to negotiate in good faith if, 
at the time an offer is made or accepted by that party, it has an 
undisclosed and absolute intent to initiate or support 
proceedings to nullify the agreement once reached, and, thus, no 
intent to comply with its agreement. On this record, however, 
the Association cannot be found to have had that intent when it 
agreed to Article IV, §A. Even when read most favorably to the 
City, the stipulated record facts reasonably show only that the 
Association had an intention when it bargained Article IV, §A to 
pursue its doubts regarding the validity of that clause by making 
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an inquiry to appropriate state and local officials at any unit 
employee's subsequent request. We do not consider a party's 
making of such an inquiry to be inconsistent with the statutory 
concept of good faith. The Association's subsequent statements 
and actions which were premised upon the intervening opinions 
from the state and local civil service commissions that the 
clause was invalid and unenforceable do not evidence the 
existence of the necessary intent at the date the agreement to 
Article IV, §A was bargained or struck. 
Having affirmed the ALJ's decision for the reasons stated 
above, it is unnecessary for us to consider the Association's 
cross-exceptions. 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: August 14, 1991 
Albany, New York 
y i rU ft-.fctAftLlL 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
yu4Uc^/. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
FRANK BELARDO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-11589 
-and- _: 
COVE NECK POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
JASPAN, GINSBERG, EHRLICH, SCHLESINGER & HOFFMAN (JACOB S. 
FELDMAN of counsel), for Charging Party 
LERNER, GORDON & HIRSCH, P.C. (LAWRENCE M. GORDON of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Frank Belardo 
(charging party) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) which dismisses his charge against the Cove Neck Police 
Benevolent Association (PBA). The ALJ dismissed the charge 
before hearing on a finding that this Board was without 
jurisdiction^/ because the charge encompassed only an internal 
membership dispute involving an election for union officers. 
The charging party, a part-time police officer for the 
Village of Cove Neck, alleges that part-time officers are 
included in a unit with full-time officers represented by the 
i/see generally Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, 17 PERB f3 072 
(1984). 
Board - U-11589 -2 
PBA. The PBA's refusal to represent the part-time officers or to 
otherwise recognize their unit and union status is alleged to 
violate the part-time officers1 rights under the Act. The PBA 
denies that it represents the part-time officers or that it has 
any statutory duties in that regard It asserts that any 
representation it may have afforded the part-time officers in the 
past was in the nature of voluntary services only. 
The charging party argues in his exceptions that the charge 
is within our jurisdiction because it concerns the statutory 
rights of the part-time police officers to representation by the 
PBA, not their right to hold PBA office. Moreover, the charging 
party argues that he should have been afforded a hearing to 
resolve disputed issues of material fact. 
For the following reasons, we reverse the AKT's decision and 
remand the case for further processing. 
From our review of the charging party's pleading, we are 
persuaded that the AKJ read it too narrowly. Although an 
election for union office may have triggered the filing, and the 
charge may include the election dispute as one of its aspects, 
the charge, as filed, is more than a one-issue complaint. 
The charge centers upon a March 20, 1990 letter from the 
PBA's attorney in which it is stated several times that the PBA 
represents only full-time police officers, not any part-time 
officers. The charging party alleges in his charge, however, 
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that the part-time officers are represented by the PBA, an 
allegation which the PBA denied in its answer along with every 
other allegation made by the charging party. The PBA's denial of 
its status as the bargaining agent for the part-time officers 
allegedly has interfered with the statutory rights of the 
charging party to join and participate in the PBA. The charging 
party clarified any ambiguity in his pleading in a memorandum 
submitted to the ALT at her invitation after she informed him 
that the charge appeared to involve only a question of internal 
union affairs beyond our jurisdiction. A central point in that 
memorandum was that the PBA's exclusion of the part-time officers 
) from the unit and union violated the fundamental purposes and 
policies of the Act and the rights of the part-time officers 
under §202 of the Act. The charging party argued specifically, 
for example, that the PBA's treatment of the part-time officers 
had deprived them of services provided by the PBA as bargaining 
agent vis-a-vis their employment relationship such as the 
statutory right to be represented by the PBA for purposes of 
collective bargaining and grievance administration. 
As we view the charge, both as pleaded and as clarified, the 
charging party put in issue the PBA's status as the bargaining 
agent for the part-time police officers, whether they be in one 
unit with the full-time officers, as alleged by the charging 
party, or in a separate unit, as suggested by the ALJ on the 
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record before her. In either circumstance, the PBA's denial that 
it represents part-time officers raises issues which are divorced 
from matters of purely internal union affairs and which, 
therefore, lie within the scope of our jurisdiction. 
Depending upon the facts^ascertained on remand, the ALT 
should decide whether the PBA unilaterally altered the 
composition of the bargaining unit, or abandoned a separate unit 
of part-time officers, and, if so, whether such conduct violates 
§209-a.2(a) of the Act. We express no opinion on the merits of 
the charging party's allegations in this respect, only that they 
are within our jurisdiction to decide. Of course, if it is 
) determined on remand that the PBA is not the statutory bargaining 
agent for the part-time officers, the charge would be properly 
dismissed because in that circumstance it would involve only an 
alleged deprivation of the membership rights and privileges of 
union members which lie outside our jurisdiction. 
The record before the ALJ did not definitively establish the 
unit status of the part-time officers and it is our determination 
to permit the charging party a hearing at which the facts 
associated with that issue can be fully investigated and 
developed, including the disputed authenticity of PBA by-laws 
which the ALJ relied upon in reaching her decision. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the charging party's exceptions 
are granted, the ALJ's decision is reversed, and the case is 
remanded to the AKT for further processing consistent with this 
decision. 
DATED: August 14 , 1 9 3 1 
Albany, New York 
T X u J w ^C-lAfil^l 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
" Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#2C-8/14/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, NASSAU 
LOCAL 830, 
Charging Party, 
_CASE NO. U-11550 
-and-
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
BEE, DeANGELIS & EISMAN (PETER A. BEE of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Nassau Local 830 (CSEA) to a decision by the Assistant Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant 
Director). The Assistant Director dismissed CSEA•s charge 
against the County of Nassau (County) which alleges that the 
County violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally changed the work 
schedules of certain unit employees. The Assistant Director 
dismissed the charge because the parties' contract authorized the 
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schedule changes^/ and, therefore, CSEA waived any further 
right to negotiate those changes. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the contract 
language,-2/ which allows the County to both regulate and change 
work schedules, is not a waiver of its statutory right under 
Starpoint Central School District-3-^ (Starpoint) to negotiate 
the manner in which employees will be assigned to provide a 
selected level of service. 
We stated in Starpoint that although staffing levels and the 
selection of the days and hours of an employer's operations are 
management prerogatives, the selection of the method or manner by 
which the prerogative is accomplished is mandatorily negotiable 
if there are alternative means to the chosen end. CSEA's 
exceptions suggest, incorrectly, that Starpoint created some 
meaningful distinction between bargaining over work schedules and 
^The changes involved two new shifts assigned to employees 
periodically on a rotating basis. 
^•/The County argues in response to CSEA's exceptions that we 
have no jurisdiction over the charge under §205.5(d) of the Act. 
Jurisdiction is possessed because the parties did not have a 
contractual relationship at the date the work schedules were 
changed. The prior agreement had expired on December 31, 1989 
and a successor was then being negotiated. The provisions of the 
expired contract were continued under §209-a.l(e) of the Act 
during the hiatus period and, therefore, they are material to the 
merits disposition of the charge. 
•^23 PERB ?[3012 (1990) . In Starpoint, the employer changed 
a unit employee's work schedule from Monday through Friday to 
Wednesday through Sunday. Although we recognized the employer's 
right to establish regular weekend coverage, we subjected the 
employer's assignment of the employee to the revised work 
schedule to a bargaining duty in the absence of any proof from 
the employer of a compelling need to make the change. 
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bargaining over the method, manner or means of implementation of 
an employer's staffing decisions. It concedes, for example, the 
County's right to regulate or change work schedules, but claims 
that there is an independent, residual duty to bargain how those 
schedules will be covered. However, for most purposes in 
general, and for this case in particular, the differently worded 
articulations of the bargaining obligation which stems from an 
employer's staffing decisions are synonymous. Our references in 
Starpoint to the mandatorily negotiable aspects of an employer's 
staffing decisions were intended simply to embrace the assignment 
of employees to work schedules. That duty to bargain work 
schedule assignments is as much subject to satisfaction and 
waiver as any other term and condition of employment. 
In that latter respect, we are persuaded, as was the 
Assistant Director, that CSEA has given to the County in 
bargaining the specific right to both regulate and change the 
employees' work schedules under certain conditions which were 
admittedly satisfied. Consistent with our earlier 
interpretations of the same contract language,4-/ we hold that 
the contract evidences a plain and clear waiver-5-/ of CSEA's 
right to negotiate the changes which were made in the existing 
work schedules. Therefore, the County's implementation of the 
^See County of Nassau cases reported at 18 PERB 53 034 
(1985), 13 PERB 53053 (1980), 12 PERB 53105 (1979), and 
12 PERB 53049 (1979). 
^ S e e CSEA v. Newman. 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB 57011 (3d Dep't 
1982), appeal dismissed, 57 N.Y.2d 775, 15 PERB 57020 (1982). 
Board - U-11550 
-4 
work schedule changes in issue was proper because contractually 
based. 
Based upon the foregoing, CSEA's exceptions are denied, the 
Assistant Director's decision is affirmed, and IT IS, THEREFORE, 
ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 14, 1991 
Albany, New York 
taiL/RA^L 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
/4**4**.Y~ 
Walter L. E i senbe rg , Membjsr 
? 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ONEONTA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
NEA, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-11473 
-and-
ONEONTA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
RICHARD CATERINO, for Charging Party 
JOSEPH T. PONDOLFINO, JR., ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Oneonta City School District (District) excepts to an 
Administrative Law Judge's (ALT) decision that it violated 
§2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it unilaterally banned smoking in all of its buildings and 
refused to negotiate the ban on demand by the Oneonta Teachers 
Association, NEA/NY, NEA (Association). 
Finding the material facts not in dispute, the ALJ held 
after a hearing that the District's smoking ban was mandatorily 
negotiable because it was more restrictive than the minimum 
requirements of New York's Clean Indoor Air Act (Clean Air 
Act) M 
-3=/N.Y. Pub. Health Law Art. 13-E (McKinney 1990) . 
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The District grounds its exceptions on several procedural 
and substantive errors allegedly committed by the ALJ. The 
District argues that the ALJ should have granted either its 
motion to dismiss the charge for failure to state a cause of 
action or its motion to particularize the charge, and should have 
joined two other unions which represent District employees as 
parties to the charge. Substantively, the District alleges that 
the AU's findings are generally contrary to law and the record 
evidence. 
The District's motion to dismiss the charge is based upon an 
alleged pleading defect. The District argues that the charge as 
pleaded is defective as a matter of law because: 
1. it does not state specifically that the District's 
smoking ban is more restrictive than the 
requirements of the Clean Air Act; 
2. it does not identify specifically each aspect of 
the smoking ban which is more restrictive than the 
requirements of the Clean Air Act; and 
3. it does not plead that the District, in fact, 
adopted a smoking ban. 
Our pleading requirements are satisfied by a concise 
recitation of facts which may constitute a violation of the 
Act.-2-/ The first numbered contention in support of the 
District's motion to dismiss involves purely a conclusion of law 
^/Rules of Procedure §§204.1(b)(3) & 204.2(a). 
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which, while helpful, need not be pleaded. The second involves 
more of a mixed issue of fact and law than the first, but it 
similarly ultimately necessitates a conclusion of law which need 
not be pleaded. The third numbered contention in support of the 
District's motion alleges a failure to plead a fact necessary to 
the unilateral change aspect of the charge. In assessing whether 
a charge is sufficiently pleaded on a motion to dismiss, it is 
appropriate to consider both the allegations set forth on the 
charge form itself and those in the attachments to that charge. 
In reviewing all of the papers as filed, we find that the 
Association's pleadings are plainly sufficient. When the charge 
is read in the light most favorable to the Association, as it 
must be on the District's motion,-3-/ the charge alleges a 
unilateral change in smoking practice pursuant to a resolution 
which, although temporarily tabled, had been announced and 
effectively adopted. 
As an alternative to its motion to dismiss, the District 
moved before the ALJ for particularization of the charge. 
However, the District's motion for particularization was 
accompanied by its answer to the charge. A motion for the 
particularization of a charge is properly granted only to the 
•^See City of Yonkers. 23 PERB 53055 (1990). 
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extent necessary to enable the respondent to answer.-4^ By-
answering the charge, the District necessarily conceded that the 
Association's charge was not so vague and indefinite as to be 
reasonably incapable of being answered. Therefore, on this basis 
alone, the ALJ's failure or refusal to grant the District's 
motion for particularization was not error. 
Moreover, we do not find that the absence of a more 
particularized pleading prejudiced the District at the hearing as 
it claims. The District argues in its exceptions that it would 
have presented certain evidence regarding smoking in the 
teachers' lounges had it known before the hearing that the 
teachers' lounges were likely to be in issue. In its answer, 
however, which was filed more than two months before the hearing, 
the District alleges on information and belief that the 
Association wanted "the right to smoke in the teachers lounge". 
It is clear to us, therefore, that the District knew that the 
teachers* lounges were likely to be in issue at the hearing and 
that it refrained from introducing whatever relevant evidence it 
may have had for reasons unrelated to the one alleged in its 
exceptions. 
As to the joinder of any other unions which represent 
District employees, it does not appear from the record that the 
^•/Rules of Procedure §204.3(b). Compare the motion for 
particularization of an answer which is properly granted to 
enable the movant to address the respondent's affirmative 
defenses in an expeditious manner at the hearing. Rules of 
Procedure §204.3(d). 
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ALJ was ever asked to join any other parties. The ALT was not 
required to join other unions with or without request, because 
our Rules of Procedure and hearing practice do not require or 
authorize compulsory joinder in these circumstances. Moreover, 
these other unions were in no way necessary to the disposition of 
this charge. If interested, they could have moved to intervene 
to protect their interests.-^ Finally, the ALT's remedial 
order is directed only to the employees in the Association's 
negotiating unit. The District's smoking policy as it applies to 
other District employees is not affected in any way by the ALJ's 
order. The District's exception in this regard is, accordingly, 
denied. 
The District's remaining exceptions are directed to the 
ALJ's conclusions of fact and law. 
As to the former, the record clearly establishes that the 
District banned smoking in all of its buildings. The District 
specifically admitted that it banned smoking in all of its 
buildings both in its answer and on the record at the hearing. 
The record also establishes that the teachers' lounges were one 
of the designated smoking areas in use prior to the District's 
promulgation and implementation of the smoking ban. The 
District's exceptions in this respect are, accordingly, denied. 
The District's remaining exception necessitates an 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act and an analysis of the 
•=*/Rules of Procedure §204.5. 
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interplay between the provisions of that statute and the Act. 
The Clean Air Act prohibits smoking in certain specific 
indoor areas open to the public-^/ and certain places of 
employment.-^/ To the extent smoking is not prohibited, the 
Clean Air Act authorizes the establishment of designated smoking 
areas including public indoor areas within public schools.^/ 
The subdivision of the Clean Air Act pertaining to places of 
employment^/ specifically authorizes the designation of a 
smoking room for employees.±0/ An employee lounge need only 
contain contiguous nonsmoking areas^^ sufficient to meet 
employee demand. Unlike smoking areas within work areas, which 
must be physically separated from the smoke-free work 
areas,-^/ there is no similar requirement under the Clean Air 
Act for employee lounges. A nonsmoking employee is entitled to a 
smoke-free work area.^^ Employee lounges, however, are not 
•^/ciean Air Act §1399-o.l includes auditoriums, elevators, 
gymnasiums, swimming pool areas and classrooms. 
^/ciean Air Act §1399-o.6(d) & (e) includes the areas listed 
in §1399-o.l and rest rooms, hallways, medical facilities, rooms 
with photocopying or office equipment and company vehicles. 
^/ciean Air Act §l399-o.3. 
place of employment is defined in §1399-n.7 of the Clean 
Air Act as an indoor area not generally accessible to the public 
in which employees perform services for their employer. 
i^/ciean Air Act §1399-o.6(f). 
^=/ciean Air Act §1399-o.6(c) . 
^/ciean Air Act §1399-n.ll. 
^/clean Air Act §1399-o.6(a) & (h). 
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treated as work areas for purposes of the Clean Air Act. 
Therefore, contrary to the District's contention, it would not be 
required to ban smoking in a teachers' lounge even on demand by a 
nonsmoking employee. 
Two other sections of the Clean Air Act are relevant to the 
disposition of this charge. 
Section 1399-r.l provides that "nothing in [the Clean Air 
Act] shall be construed to deny the owner...of a place covered by 
[the Clean Air Act] the right to designate the entire place, or 
any part thereof, as a nonsmoking area." 
However, §1399-r.l cannot be read alone. It must be read in 
conjunction with §1399-o.6(i), which provides that provisions in 
an employer's required^^ smoking policy "that are more 
restrictive than the minimum requirements" of the applicable 
provisions of the Clean Air Act "shall be subject to the 
applicable law governing collective bargaining." 
The record shows that smoking was permitted in the teachers• 
lounges for years until prohibited under the District's 
unilaterally imposed ban. Nothing in the Clean Air Act required 
the District to ban smoking in the teachers* lounges. Therefore, 
the ban as it applies to the teachers' lounges is more 
restrictive than the mandates imposed by the Clean Air Act. As 
§1399-o.6(i) makes clear, it was the Legislature's stated 
intention to preserve an employer's duty to bargain regarding 
Clean Air Act §1399-o.6. 
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those smoking policies which embrace mandatory subjects of 
negotiation under the Act except to the extent the employer's 
discretion to act was taken away by the requirements imposed by 
the Clean Air Act. Section 1399-r.l merely ensures that nothing 
in the Clean Air Act itself can be used to prohibit a smoking 
ban. When the unilateral imposition of a total smoking ban is 
prohibited or restricted by other provisions of state law, 
§1399-r.l of the Clean Air Act cannot be read to repeal those 
external sources of obligation. A ban on employee smoking in a 
teachers' lounge is presumptively a mandatory subject of 
negotiation which subjects an employer to a statutory duty to 
bargain under the Act.-^5-/ That duty is unaffected in relevant 
respect by any provision in the Clean Air Act. There being 
nothing in the record to counterbalance the negotiability 
determination, the District's unilateral promulgation and 
implementation of a smoking ban and its refusal to bargain the 
ban pursuant to the Association's demand violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Act. In that latter respect, the District was not privileged 
initially to condition its obligation to meet with the 
Association on the Association's recitation of the particular 
^ S e e , e.g. , County of Niagara (Mount View Health 
Facility) , 21 PERB J[3014 (1988) ; Rush-Henrietta Cent. School 
Dist. . 21 PERB 1[3023 (1988), modified. 151 A.D.2d 1001, 
22 PERB ^7016 (4th Dep't 1989) (subsequent history omitted). 
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aspects of the smoking ban which the Association wanted to 
negotiate. •i2/ Neither was it thereafter privileged to refuse 
to negotiate all aspects of the promulgation and implementation 
of the smoking ban. 
Based on the foregoing, the District's exceptions are denied 
and the AKT's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Rescind the ban on smoking in teachers' 
lounges^-^ as it applies to the employees 
in the Association's unit; 
2. Negotiate in good faith with the Association 
regarding those aspects of the smoking ban 
which are more restrictive than the minimum 
requirements of the Clean Air Act. 
•2^ /We view the District's obligation in this circumstance to 
be similar to an employer's duty to negotiate the impact of a 
managerial prerogative. Just as an employer is not privileged to 
refuse to meet until the union particularizes its impact 
bargaining demands, so, too, the District was not privileged to 
condition its willingness to negotiate on the Association's 
specification of those aspects of the ban which it considered to 
be more restrictive than the minimum requirements of the Clean 
Air Act. 
i-^/This is a change in the order issued by the ALJ who 
rescinded the smoking ban to whatever unspecified extent it 
exceeded the minimum requirements of the Clean Air Act. We 
consider the modification to be appropriate to conform the 
remedial order to the record evidence supporting the violation. 
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Sign and post notice in the form attached at 
all locations ordinarily used to post notices 
of information to unit employees. 
August 14, 1991 
Albany,__ New York 
£(L* 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chai Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member f 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify
 a l l employees in the unit represented by the Oneonta 
Teachers Association, NEA/NY, NEA (Association) that the Oneonta 
City School District (District): 
1. Will rescind the ban on smoking in teachers' 
lounges as it applies to the employees in the 
Association's unit; 
2. Will negotiate in good faith with the Association 
regarding those aspects of the smoking ban which are 
more restrictive than the minimum requirements of the 
Clean Air Act. 
ONEONTA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated By " 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2E-8/14/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF AUDIT 
AND CONTROL), 
Employer, 
-and-
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
Intervenor. 
CASE NO. CP-215 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, ESQ. (LAUREN DESOLE of counsel), 
for Employer 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, ESQ. (NANCY L. BURRITT of counsel), 
for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) which dismissed after a 
hearing a unit clarification petition filed by CSEA. CSEA's 
petition was occasioned by the State of New York's (Department of 
Audit and Control) (State) designation of Employee Retirement 
Board - CP-215 
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System Examiner (ERSE) 
ivV
 as 
a position within the 
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services Unit (PS&T), 
which is represented by the Public Employees Federation (PEF). 
CSEA claims that the ERSE IV position is encompassed within the 
scope of its Administrative Services Unit (ASU). 
The Director dismissed CSEA's petition on a finding that the 
inclusion of the ERSE IV position in the PS&T unit comported with 
the scope of the PS&T unit as defined by us in earlier 
decisions.-2-/ 
In its exceptions, CSEA alleges that the Director 
incorrectly ascribed a burden of proof to it and drew erroneous 
conclusions from the record regarding the level of supervision 
actually exercised by the ERSE IVs. PEF urges in its response 
that we affirm the Director's dismissal. 
For the reasons which follow, CSEA's exceptions are denied 
and the Director's dismissal of the unit clarification petition 
is affirmed. 
A unit clarification petition seeks only a factual 
determination as to whether a job title is actually encompassed 
i/The ERSE title series was created in late 1988 by the 
State Department of Civil Service after a title structure change 
and reclassification involving five titles. ERSE IV is one of 
several levels in the ERSE series. Twenty-one of the current 
ERSE IVs were in the ASU unit in their former job titles; six 
were in the PS&T unit. 
Estate of New York, 1 PERB 5399.85 (1968), conf'd. 
32 A.D.2d 131, 2 PERB f7007 (3d Dep't 1969), aff'd, 
25 N.Y.2d 842, 2 PERB 57012 (1969); State of New York, 
2 PERB 53044 (1969). 
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within the scope of the petitioner's unit. We have held a unit 
clarification petitioner to a burden of proof on its petition 
because that particular type of petition necessarily seeks only a 
determination of fact.^/ A unit clarification petition differs 
from a unit placement petition. Although both are directed to 
newly created or substantially altered titles, only the unit 
placement petition puts the appropriateness of the unit under 
§207 of the Act in issue. Moreover, the unit placement petition 
proceeds from the finding or admission that the position in issue 
is not in the petitioner's unit, but should be most appropriately 
placed there. The uniting criteria set forth in §2 07 of the Act 
can be material to the disposition of the fact question which 
underlies the unit clarification petition, but only if and to the 
extent they evidence the actual scope of the bargaining unit. 
CSEA argues that the ASU and PS&T units are defined in 
relevant respect by the level of supervisory authority exercised 
by the incumbents of the particular job title. Although it 
concedes that most third level supervisors are in the PS&T unit, 
it claims that lower level supervisors are in its ASU unit. It 
concludes that the ERSE IVs must be in the ASU unit because they 
do not, in fact, yet exercise third level supervisory authority. 
We reject CSEA's argument for two reasons. First, we are 
not persuaded that the record proves that all first and second 
level supervisors are included in the ASU unit. Second, whether 
^•/civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
21 PERB ^3030, aff'a 21 PERB 54012 (1988). 
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the ERSE IVs exercise third level supervisory authority is not 
dispositive of this particular type of petition. In keeping with 
its burden of proof, it was incumbent upon CSEA to prove that 
only the designation of the ERSE IV as an ASU position would be 
consistent with the scope of the ASU and PS&T units as created 
and presently constituted. Having reviewed the record, we agree 
with the Director's conclusion that the State assigned the 
ERSE IV title to the PS&T unit after an examination of the 
differing supervisory responsibilities of several job titles 
within the ASU and the PS&T units. There being record evidence 
that the supervisory duties and responsibilities of the ERSE IVs, 
as defined in the job description for that position and as 
actually carried out, are like those of others in similarly 
graded titles within the PS&T unit, the Director's decision must 
be affirmed. By our affirmance, however, we express no opinion 
as to whether the ERSE IVs would be most appropriately included 
in the PS&T unit upon an application of the statutory uniting 
criteria because that question is not raised by the unit 
clarification petition. As the Director suggested, the 
appropriateness of the ERSE IVs' uniting may be raised by a 
representation petition filed under §2 01.3 of the Rules of 
Procedure or, perhaps, by a unit placement petition.-4-/ 
^There may be a question at this date whether the ERSE IV 
is a new or substantially altered position as required by 
§201.2(b) of the Rules. 
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Based upon the foregoing, CSEA's exceptions are denied, the 
Director's decision is affirmed, and the petition is dismissed. 
DATED: August 14, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsell'a, Chairperson 
£**€*.£ 
Walter L. E i senbe rg , Maaaber 
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 ") STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GENESEE COMMUNITY COLLEGE EDUCATIONAL 
SUPPORT PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-3542 
-and-
GENESEE COMMUNITY COLLEGE and 
COUNTY OF GENESEE, 
Employer, 
-and-
GENESEE COUNTY EMPLOYEE'S UNIT, 
LOCAL 819, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
ROBERT D. CLEARFIELD, ESQ. (ROBERT W. 
KLINGENSMITH, JR. of counsel), for Petitioner 
HARTER, SECREST & EMERY (BARRY R. WHITMAN and ERIC 
A. EVANS of counsel), for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (STEVEN CRAIN of counsel), for 
Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Genesee 
County Employee's Unit, Local 819, Civil Service Employees 
Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision by 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director). The Director held that Genesee Community College 
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(College) was a legal entity separate from its sponsor, the 
County of Genesee (County), and that the College was the joint 
public employer within the meaning of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) with the County of the nonpedagogical 
employees who work at the College. Adopting his earlier decision 
in Niagara Community College and County of Niagara (hereafter 
Niagara) ,-3=/ which was not appealed to us, the Director 
determined that the joint employer relationship between the 
College and the County warranted the fragmentation of the 
nonpedagogical employees from the county-wide unit represented by 
CSEA pursuant to the petition filed by the Genesee Community 
College Educational Support Personnel Association, NEA/NY 
(Association). 
CSEA excepts to the Director's conclusions that the College 
is a legal entity separate from the County and that the College 
is the joint employer of the noninstructional employees who work 
at the College. CSEA argues that the County is the sole 
employer. 
The Association alleges in its response that CSEA's 
exceptions are untimely and argues, alternatively, that the 
Director's decision was in all respects correct. 
We deal first with the Association's claim that CSEA's 
exceptions are untimely. Exceptions must be filed and served 
-^23 PERB 5[4052 (1990). 
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within 15 working days of a party's receipt of the Director's 
decision,^/ the date of receipt itself being excluded from the 
computation. CSEA received the Director's decision on 
December 31, 1990, and filed and served its exceptions by mail on 
January 23, 1991, the fifteenth working day thereafter. Its 
exceptions are, accordingly, timely. 
Turning to the merits, we affirm the Director's material 
conclusions of fact and law. The issues raised by CSEA in its 
exceptions were presented to the Director and his decision, which 
incorporates his earlier decision in Niagara, sets forth a 
comprehensive analysis of the controlling provisions of statute 
and regulation. We adopt the Director's decision, and for the 
reasons set forth therein, and in our own decision in Dutchess 
Community College,-^ we hold that a community college is an 
entity with a legal identity separate from its sponsor, that a 
community college is a public employer under §201.6(a) of the 
Act, and that a county-sponsored community college is a joint 
employer within the meaning of the Act with the sponsoring county 
•^Rules of Procedure §2 01.12 (a). 
2^17 PERB H3010 (1984) (subsequent history omitted). 
Although the public employer status of the community college was 
not in dispute in that case, we concluded as a necessary part of 
our analysis that a county sponsored community college is a 
public employer within the meaning of the Act. 
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of those employees hired by the community college because control 
over the terms of the employees * employment relationship is 
divided between and shared by the community college and the 
sponsoring county as a matter of law. 
Only two points in CSEA's exceptions warrant any comment 
beyond that in the Director's decision and this Board's in 
Dutchess Community College. 
Since 1984, the Education Law has permitted a community 
college to be regionally sponsored by two or more contiguous 
counties or school districts. Under this sponsoring arrangement, 
§6310.12 of the Education Law deems the community college 
regional board of trustees to be the public employer for purposes 
of the Act. There is no similar provision in the Education Law 
concerning the identity of the employer for a county-sponsored 
community college. CSEA argues that this omission evidences a 
legislative intention that a county-sponsored community college 
is not an employer for purposes of the Act, joint or otherwise. 
However, since 1975,^ §209.3(f) of the Act has specifically 
referenced a community college as one of the Act's several 
"public employers". This itself is sufficient to negate the 
inference regarding legislative intent which CSEA would have us 
draw from the subsequent enactment of Education Law §6310.12. 
^\<Z15 N.Y. Laws ch. 850. 
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The Legislature could not possibly have intended by identifying 
the community college as the public employer under one special 
type of sponsoring arrangement to have denied all other community 
colleges public employer status when its earlier enactment, which 
specifically identifies a community college as a public employer, 
was continued unchanged on and after enactment of Education Law 
§6310.12. 
CSEA also relies upon Education Law §§63 08 and 63 09 which 
make the sponsoring county responsible for the defense and 
indemnification of community college employees and members of the 
college's board of trustees for certain civil and criminal acts 
arising out of or in the course of their employment. Unlike 
CSEA, we do not view these two sections of the Education Law to 
be necessarily a codification of common law doctrines of 
respondeat superior, master and servant or principal and agent. 
Enactment of these provisions of the Education Law reflects more 
logically nothing more than a recognition of the county's fiscal 
responsibilities as the community college's sponsoring entity. 
Without CSEA's assumptions, which we do not make, the defense and 
indemnification provisions in Education Law §§63 08 and 6309 are 
meaningless to any analysis regarding the status of a community 
college as a public employer under the Act. Based upon the 
foregoing, CSEA's exceptions are denied, the Director's decision 
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is affirmed and the case is remanded to the Director for such 
further processing as is appropriate. 
DATED: August 14, 1991 
Albany, New York 
faJiLL%kdv<JU. 
Pauline R. Kinsella,^Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member/ 
#2G-8/14/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-1137? 
-and-
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF 
MILITARY AND NAVAL AFFAIRS), 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, ESQ. (RICHARD J. DAUTNER and GARY 
JOHNSON of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by both the State 
of New York (Division of Military and Naval Affairs) (State) and 
the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to an Administrative Law Judge's (ALT) 
decision. The ALT held that the State violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally changed its practice regarding the computation of 
paid military leave. 
CSEA represents airport fire fighters who normally work six 
24-hour shifts during a 14-day period. Before January 1, 1990, 
an airport fire fighter who was absent from scheduled duty for 
ordered military duty had to charge only 1 working day of 
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military leave for each continuous 24-hour period. Effective 
January 1, 1990, whenever a fire fighter is scheduled to work 
past midnight on a 24-hour shift, the fire fighter must charge 3 
working days to military leave if absent. The revised method of 
computationresults in a more rapid exhaustion of military leave 
credits than previously. The State's admitted unilateral change 
in computation method was based upon an opinion issued by the 
State Comptroller that a 24-hour shift consists of 3 working days 
for purposes of computing paid military leave under Military Law 
§242(5). Military Law §242(5) requires employers to pay their 
public officers and employees their salary or other compensation 
) while in ordered military duty for a period "not exceeding a 
total of thirty days or twenty-two working days, whichever is 
greater, in any one calendar year...[or] in any one continuous 
period of such absence." 
CSEA excepts only to the AKJ's failure to issue a make-whole 
order, which the State argues was appropriately omitted because 
the parties' stipulated record does not evidence that any 
employee was damaged by the State's change in the method of 
computing military leave. 
The State alleges that the ALT erred procedurally by not 
deferring.jurisdiction in favor of a judicial proceeding and 
substantively by finding that the State's military leave practice 
was changed. In the latter respect, the State contends before us 
) that there has not been any change in its military leave practice 
i 
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because its practice has been to provide paid military leave to 
employees only as and to the extent required and authorized by 
Military Law §242(5). The State argues that when the State 
Comptroller interpreted Military Law §242(5) to require that a 
24-hour shift be treated as 3_ working days for purposes of 
computing paid military leave under Military Law §242(5), it was 
required and privileged to discontinue having employees charge 
only 1 working day of military leave for each continuous 24-hour 
period of absence, a practice which it alleges stemmed from a 
mistaken interpretation of the requirements of Military Law 
§242(5). 
Turning first to the State's exceptions, we affirm the ALT's 
decision to retain jurisdiction over this charge for the reasons 
stated in her decision. Moreover, given the State's position 
before us, our interpretation of Military Law §242(5) is 
unnecessary.-^/ The State's argument in defense does not 
require us to decide whether Military Law §242(5) forbids leave 
practices more generous than the minimums required by that 
statute because the State now concedes that Military Law §242(5) 
does not prohibit leaves in excess of 30 days. It is similarly 
unnecessary to decide whether the State Comptroller's 
would affirm the ALJ's interpretation of Military Law 
§242(5) if necessary. We do not read either in the language of 
Military Law §242(5) or in its history any legislative intention 
to make salary payments in excess of those required by Military 
Law §242(5) illegal when those payments are made pursuant to the 
employer's bargaining obligations under the Act. 
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interpretation of Military Law §242(5) is correct. Therefore, no 
rationale has been offered to support the State's request for 
deferral. 
On the merits, the stipulated record satisfied the burden of 
proof assigned CSEA on a unilateral change case under 
Schuylerville Central School District.^J it was the State's 
burden thereafter to prove that the change was otherwise 
permissible because its military leave practice was in some way 
limited or conditioned. 
The State argues that the unit employees' military leave 
benefits are defined and limited by Military Law §242(5). This 
argument necessitates a finding that the State's military leave 
practice represented nothing more than the administration of the 
statutory benefits available under Military Law §242(5). We are 
not persuaded, however, that the stipulated record proves that 
Military Law §242(5) was the sole source of the leave benefits 
extended to unit employees. The record establishes in relevant 
part only that the State changed its method of computing charges 
to military leave in reliance upon a State Comptroller's opinion 
regarding the meaning of working days in the context of a 24-hour 
shift. That the State's change in practice was prompted by an 
interpretation of Military Law §242(5) does not prove, however, 
that the State's military leave practices were initially 
established and subsequently maintained strictly in accordance 
•
2
-/l4 PERB ?[3035, aff'a 14 PERB ?[4505 (1981). 
Board - U-11377 -5 
with the terms of that statute. In the absence of proof that the 
State's practice was defined solely by the terms of Military Law 
§242(5), and the administrative or judicial interpretations 
thereof, the ALJ's finding that the State violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Act must be affirmed. 
Regarding the remedy ordered by the ALJ, we agree with CSEA 
that it should have included make-whole relief. Make-whole 
relief is ordered as a matter of policy, absent demonstrated good 
cause to the contrary, to address the possibility that employees 
may have been damaged by a respondent's unlawful acts. We do not 
insist upon record proof that unit employees have been damaged in 
fact. To the contrary, a party is not required to make any 
particular pleading of damages and we have discouraged litigation 
regarding damages during the course of the improper practice 
proceeding. Even if no employees were actually affected as of 
the date of the ALJ's order, they may have been in the time which 
has since elapsed. Whether and to what extent any unit employees 
have been damaged by the State's change in the computation of 
military leave will be readily ascertainable from time and 
attendance records or such subsequent proceedings as may be 
necessary.^J if no employees were damaged, the make-whole 
portion of the remedial order will have no application and the 
State is not prejudiced by its issuance. If the order did not 
issue, however, the State would profit from its improper practice 
•2/see County of Broome, 22 PERB [^3019 (1989) . 
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if even one unit employee was disadvantaged by the State's 
action.-4/ 
Based upon the foregoing, the State's exceptions are denied, 
CSEA's exception is granted, the ALJ's decision is affirmed 
except as modified as to remedy, and IT ISL, THEREFORE, ORDERED 
that the State: 
1. Rescind the September 25, 1989 memorandum 
regarding military leave; 
2. Restore the practice regarding the computation of 
military leave and charges thereto as it existed 
immediately prior to the September 25, 1989 
memorandum; 
3. Recalculate military leave credits for all 
affected unit employees under the method which 
existed immediately prior to the September 25, 
1989 memorandum and restore any military leave 
credits as recalculated which were charged by any 
unit employee beyond those required to be charged 
under the method which existed immediately prior 
to the September 25, 1989 memorandum. Restore any 
other leave credits charged by employees who were 
absent on ordered military duty with corresponding 
offset by charge to military leave credits as 
^See City of Dunkirk, 23 PERB ^3025 (1990), for a 
discussion of the general principles which underlie any of our 
remedial orders. 
Board U-11377 -7 
recalculated and credited under the method which 
existed immediately prior to the September 25, 
1989 memorandum. Make whole any employees unable 
by circumstance to utilize such leave credits for 
any wages or benefits lost as a result of the 
application of the September 25, 1989 memorandum, 
with interest at the current maximum legal rate; 
Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations ordinarily used to post notices of 
information to unit employees. 
DATED: August 14, 1991 
Albany, New York 
^J^^LvJL 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 0 
Eric J/. Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the Division of Military and Naval 
Affairs• unit represented by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) that the 
State of Sew York (Division of Military and Naval Affairs) will: 
1. Rescind the September 25, 1989 memorandum regarding military 
leave; 
2 .\ Restore the practice regarding the computation of military 
leave and charges thereto as it existed immediately prior to 
the September 25, 1989 memorandum; 
3. Recalculate military leave credits for all affected unit 
employees under the method which existed immediately prior to 
the September 25, 1989 memorandum and restore any military 
leave credits as recalculated which were charged by any unit 
employee beyond those required to be charged under the method 
which existed immediately prior to the September 25, 1989 
memorandum. Restore any other leave credits charged by 
employees who were absent on ordered military duty with 
corresponding offset by charge to military leave credits as 
recalculated and credited under the method which existed 
immediately prior to the September 25, 1989 memorandum. Make 
whole any employees unable by-circumstance to utilize such 
leave credits for any wages or benefits lost as a result of 
the application of the September 25, 1989 memorandum, with 
interest at the current maximum legal rate. 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION 
OF MILITARY AND NAVAL AFFAIRS) 
Dated. By. 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
KINGS PARK CLASSROOM TEACHERS 
ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-11484 
-and-
KINGS PARK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
STEPHEN M. BLUTH, for Charging Party 
INGERMAN, SMITH, GREENBERG, GROSS, RICHMOND, 
HEIDELBERGER & REICH (JOHN H. GROSS of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Kings Park 
Central School District (District) to a decision by the Assistant 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director). The Assistant Director held after a 
hearing on a charge filed by the Kings Park Classroom Teachers 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (Association) that the District 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c)^/ of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it officially reprimanded a teacher, 
William Stein, for a statement he made in a letter he wrote to 
Thomas Cavanagh, President of the District's Board of Education. 
•i/The Assistant Director dismissed an alleged violation of 
§2 09-a.l(b) of the Act for a failure of proof. No exceptions 
have been filed to that aspect of his decision. 
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The Assistant Director held that the entirety of Stein's letter 
was protected. Although he found that the District's reprimand 
of Stein was not improperly motivated, the Assistant Director, 
citing our decisions in State of New York^ and Binqhamton City 
School District,-^/ held unlawful any interference or 
discrimination directed against an employee's exercise of a 
statutorily protected right. 
The District filed two exceptions to the Assistant 
Director's decision. First, the District argues that the 
Assistant Director misapplied the Supreme Court's decision in 
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.-4-/ (Great Dane) . In Great 
Dane, the Supreme Court interpreted the comparable interference 
and discrimination provisions of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA). It held that motive is not an essential element of a 
violation of those provisions of the NLRA when the employer's 
conduct is "inherently destructive" of important employee rights. 
In contrast, when the employer's conduct has only a 
"comparatively slight" adverse effect on the exercise of 
protected rights, and the employer has come forward with evidence 
of legitimate and substantial business justifications for its 
action, no violation can be found without affirmative proof of 
improper motive. Alleging that we have adopted Great Dane, the 
2/l0 PERB 13108 (1977). 
^ 2 2 PERB 1[3034 (1989). 
4/388 U.S. 26, 65 LRRM 2465 (1967). 
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District argues that the Assistant Director erred when he 
concluded that its reprimand of Stein was "inherently 
destructive" of his statutory rights. According to the District, 
its reprimand of Stein was justified and it had only a 
"comparatively slight" impact .on his exercise of protected 
rights. Therefore, once the Assistant Director held that the 
District's reprimand was not improperly motivated, the charge 
should have been dismissed. 
Under its second exception, the District argues that the 
statement for which Stein was reprimanded was not protected. 
In its cross-exceptions, which merely respond to the 
District's exceptions, the Association argues that the Assistant 
Director's findings and conclusions were correct as a matter of 
law and fact. 
The District's first exception raises interesting issues 
about whether we have adopted Great Dane-^/ and, if so, the 
proper application of Great Dane principles to the facts of this 
case. It is unnecessary, however, for us to discuss those 
several issues because the District's second exception 
necessitates a reversal of the Assistant Director's decision. 
The District's second exception is directed to the Assistant 
Director's conclusion that Stein's letter was protected in its 
•^Compare Wappingers Central School Bd. of Educ., 
10 PERB ^3028 (1977) with Spencerport Cent. School Dist., 
12 PERB f3074 (1979), in which Great Dane is cited with approval. 
Great Dane is also cited in other of our decisions and we have 
several times referred to "inherently destructive" conduct 
without citing to Great Dane. 
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entirety. Before setting forth the content of Stein's letter, we 
make a few observations which will help to place the letter in 
its proper perspective. 
First, although the Association had made form letters 
available to teachers as part of its letter-writing campaign, 
Stein chose to author his own letter to Cavanagh. Second, Stein 
was not reprimanded for writing his letter to Cavanagh about the 
then ongoing negotiations, but only for a "lack of 
professionalism" in mentioning Cavanagh's son in his letter. The 
District acknowledged to Stein that he had the right to 
communicate with board of education members regarding 
negotiations and none of the other teachers who wrote letters to 
board members were subjected to any form of discipline or 
retaliation. Finally, whether and to what extent Stein's letter 
is protected can be judged only by its content, considered in the 
context of the circumstances prevailing at the time, uninfluenced 
by either the writer•s articulated intent or the reader's 
reaction on receipt. 
Against this background, the following is the text of 
Stein's letter to Cavanagh: 
As your son's teacher this year I find myself 
in the most difficult position of maintaining 
what is, unfortunately, an adversary position 
with you as the negotiating agent for the 
Kings Park community, while being cheerful 
and pleasant to my class in order to be an 
effective teacher. Surely you must realize 
effective teaching requires goodwill and 
cooperation on the part of students and 
teachers. The adversary position created by 
the Board of Education during these contract 
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negotiations creates and spreads ill will and 
serves to destroy the positive, cheerful 
feelings necessary for a good education in 
the Kings Park Schools. The longer the Board 
continues in their hostile stand towards the 
teachers the more teachers will feel negative 
feelings towards the Board of Education, and 
inevitably towards the community itself. 
Surely it is obvious that the conditions 
being created^ are overwhelmingly jiegative J.n^  
both the long and short run for education in 
Kings Park. Is this what you, and the other 
Board members are seeking to leave Kings Park 
as your legacy? 
The Assistant Director relied in relevant part upon our 
decision in Bincrhamton City School District.-^ Our holding in 
that case that intentionally false or maliciously injurious 
statements are not protected does not mean, however, that all 
other statements spoken or written during the exercise of a 
protected right are themselves necessarily protected. Statements 
made by an employee during the exercise of a protected right may 
be denied protection for reasons having nothing to do with the 
truth of the statements or the motive behind them. For example, 
our decision in Deer Park Union Free School Distri reflects 
our sensitivity to a union's use of students to aid the union in 
the accomplishment of its goals. We there suggested that certain 
conduct by employees which causes students to become entangled in 
a labor dispute may be deemed unprotected. Similarly, in State 
^Supra note 3. 
^ 1 1 PERB f3043 (1978) (teachers' participation in union 
sponsored success card program held unprotected). 
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of New York,^/ we cautioned employees that the exercise of a 
protected right is not a license to engage in "impulsive behavior" 
or "overzealous conduct". 
Turning to Stein's letter, we find, in disagreement with the 
Assistant Director, that it represents the type of "impulsive", 
"overzealous" enmeshing of students into a then pending labor 
dispute which is unprotected. Unlike the Assistant Director, we 
find that Stein's comments reflect more than his views that 
classroom instruction might be affected adversely by the parties' 
collective negotiations. As we read Stein's letter, it is subject 
to a reasonable interpretation that because Cavanagh's son is in 
Stein's class, he and other students may be made to suffer a lower 
level and quality of instruction than they would have received 
otherwise were it not for the adversary relationship between Stein 
and Cavanagh. Whether Stein's unprotected statement is labeled 
inappropriate, insubordinate, disloyal or threatening matters 
little because the requisite statutory analysis hinges on the close 
facts of the particular case when labels are of no use. 
In concluding that the statement for which Stein was 
reprimanded was not protected, we stress the narrowness of our 
decision. We do not hold that a teacher is unprotected in 
articulating concerns about the effects of prolonged negotiations 
upon the quality of classroom education or the teacher's ability to 
teach. We hold only that, on the particular facts of this 
•^11 PERB ^3084 (1978) . 
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case, the specific statement for which Stein was reprimanded (the 
reference to Cavanagh's son) was unprotected and, therefore, he 
was permissibly subjected to discipline. 
Based upon the foregoing, the District's exceptions are 
granted in part, the Assistant Director's decision is reversed, 
and IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDEREDthat the: charge be,T and ^Lt hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 14, 1991 
Albany, New York 
/dlUt^ E^.CilMdU 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
/t^^fc. Z.^*+ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J. Schmertz, Memfeer 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CLAUDIA S. COCKERILL, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NOS. U-9708 
-and- & U-10539 
BRENTWOOD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
CLAUDIA S. COCKERILL, pro se 
BERNARD T. CALLAN, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
) These cases come to us on exceptions filed by Claudia S. 
Cockerill (charging party) to an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) 
decision which dismisses, after hearing, her two improper 
practice charges against the Brentwood Union Free School District 
(District). The charging party, a school psychologist, alleges 
that the District violated §209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by basing her building and 
workload assignments on her exercise of statutorily protected 
rights. 
The ALJ dismissed the subsection (b) allegation for failure 
of proof. He dismissed the subsection (a) and (c) allegations 
because the charging party failed to establish the necessary "but 
for" causation between the charging party's exercise of protected 
) rights and her building and workload assignments. 
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The charging party's exceptions are directed only to that 
part of the ALJ's decision concerning the District's refusal to 
return her during the 1987-88 school year to her assignment at 
Sonderling High School. Welch, the District's Coordinator of 
Health, Psychological and Social Work Services since January 
1987, removed the charging party from that assignment in late May 
1987, before the charging party had engaged in any protected 
activity. The District urges us to affirm the ALJ's decision, 
arguing that the charging party's exceptions are factually 
inaccurate in part and otherwise without merit. 
In several respects, the charging party's exceptions stem 
from a misunderstanding of the nature and limits of her rights 
under the Act. The charging party plainly considers the 
District's refusal to reassign her to Sonderling or some other 
high school to have been an arbitrary decision. She also 
believes that Welch employed pretextual reasons to block her 
return to Sonderling in cooperation with Mintz, Sonderling*s 
principal, who allegedly disliked the charging party. Even if 
true, however, these allegations afford the charging party no 
ground for a violation of the Act and no basis for a reversal of 
the ALJ's decision. There is no improper interference or 
discrimination with the charging party's exercise of statutorily 
protected rights unless the record proves that she would have 
been returned to Sonderling or given an assignment at some other 
high school in the District had she not instituted various 
proceedings protesting Welch's original decision to remove her 
Board - U-9708 & U-10539 -3 
from Sonderling. In that respect, and having reviewed the 
record, we find no basis upon which to disturb the ALJ's findings 
and conclusions which necessarily rest substantially on his 
assessment of the witnesses' credibility regarding the motives 
prompting the District•s assignments of the charging party and 
the uncontroverted timing of events. 
Based upon the foregoing, the charging party's exceptions 
are denied, the ALJ's decision is affirmed, and the charges are 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 14, 1991 
Albany, New York 
T^Mv^ T^ .» Cuvfrjl 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
h^istc*. >t 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#2J-8/14/91 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISORY ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11186 
GERMANTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
RONALD H. SINZHEIMER, ESQ. (PETER J. MOLINARO of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
WHITEMAN, OSTERMAN & HANNA, ESQS. (GUNTER DULLY of 
counsel), for Respondent 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Germantown Central School District (District) excepts to 
a decision of the Assistant Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) which finds it 
to have violated §209-a(l)(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it subcontracted unilaterally its 
school lunch program, supplemented by a new breakfast program. 
The Assistant Director based his decision upon a record 
consisting of a total of 23 stipulated exhibits. 
In its exceptions, the District asserts that it was denied 
an evidentiary hearing and that the Assistant Director based his 
decision upon facts in dispute in violation of its due process 
) and statutory rights. Among other things, it alleges that the 
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Assistant Director erroneously failed to accept as evidence 
factual allegations contained in its answer in deciding the 
merits of the charge. 
The Assistant Director notified the parties that the charge, 
its amendment, and the District's answer would constitute part of 
"the record in this case". PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) do 
not make provision for the submission of a reply to an answer, so 
that factual allegations contained in an answer to a charge are 
neither admitted nor denied by a charging party. Moreover, the 
Assistant Director stated in his decision-^/ that "[f]actual 
assertions in the pleadings which have not been admitted or 
included in the stipulated record are not part of the record 
before me." While it is certainly true that a pleading does not 
constitute evidence, and that any factual allegation made in a 
pleading must be proved if not admitted or properly noticed, it 
appears that the District understood the factual allegations 
contained in its answer to have been deemed admitted by virtue of 
the inclusion of the answer as part of the record, without any 
apparent limitation upon its use for evidentiary purposes. 
It further appears from the record in this case that some 
question existed concerning the scope and purpose of the 
submission of stipulated exhibits to the Assistant Director. 
According to the District's counsel, the District anticipated 
that the Assistant Director would decide the following three of 
•3=/ Germantown CSD, 23 PERB ^[4605, at 4735 n. 2(1990). 
Board - U-11186 
-3 
its affirmative defenses: first, that the amendment to the 
charge was untimely filed and that the charge as originally filed 
failed to set forth any claim upon which any relief could be 
granted; second, that the District was statutorily precluded 
from subsidizing a cafeteria program while on an austerity budget 
and that negotiations concerning contracting out for a 
nonsubsidized program in lieu of an in-house subsidized program 
is not a mandatory subject of negotiations; third, that the 
failure of the Administrative Supervisory Association 
(Association) to allege or establish a demand to negotiate the 
District's decision to utilize Quality Food Management, Inc. 
(QFM) for its cafeteria program requires dismissal of the charge. 
In his decision, the Assistant Director denied the first 
affirmative defense, finding that the amendment to the charge was 
itself filed within four months of the action complained of 
therein and was, therefore, timely. With respect to the second 
affirmative defense, the Assistant Director held that the fact 
that the District was precluded from subsidizing its cafeteria 
program while on an austerity budget did not require it to 
contract out the program, since the program could arguably have 
been continued in-house without subsidization. He accordingly 
dismissed the second affirmative defense. Finally, the Assistant 
Director denied the third affirmative defense, holding that the 
Association did not waive its right to negotiate, nor did the 
obligation rest with it, but instead with the District, to seek 
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negotiations on the subject of contracting for cafeteria 
services. 
In dismissing the District's second and third affirmative 
defenses, the Assistant Director made factual determinations 
concerning the possibility of the District operating its 
cafeteria program on a nonsubsidized basis in accordance with its 
austerity budget, and made factual determinations concerning 
whether, by its conduct, the Association waived its right to 
negotiate. By this, the Assistant Director extended the decision 
beyond the more narrow legal issues which the District contends 
it intended to raise by its affirmative defenses. The District 
further argues that, if the Assistant Director was going to make 
such factual determinations in deciding the affirmative defenses 
and the merits of the underlying charge, the factual allegations 
contained in its answer should have been accepted as true and 
taken into consideration, arguing that had he done so, the charge 
would have been dismissed. 
The Assistant Director also denied the District's defenses 
related to the negotiability of its decisions and found a failure 
to negotiate in good faith by virtue of the contracting out of 
food service work to QFM. 
We find that there is sufficient ambiguity on this record 
concerning the parties * understanding of the purposes to which 
the pleadings would be devoted and the issues to be addressed to 
warrant the remand of this case for further proceedings to fully 
establish all of the relevant facts before issuance of a decision 
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on its merits.-2/ Accordingly, the Assistant Director's 
decision is reversed and remanded for further proceedings, 
including additional stipulations and a hearing if necessary. 
-5 
DATED: August 14, 1991 
Albany, New York 
f<J.~tVw|lt 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memben 
Eric Z. Schmertz, Member/ 
U In view of our remand of this matter, we do not decide 
the remaining exceptions raised by the District because 
additional facts may be adduced which bear upon the merit of 
those exceptions and the outcome of the case before the Assistant 
Director. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS, 
DISTRICT UNION LOCAL 1, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-3 695 
-and- ; _.. 
MOHAWK VALLEY NURSING HOME, 
Employer. 
BELSON & SZUFLITA (GENE M. SZUFLITA of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
TOBIN & DEMPF (JOHN W. CLARK of counsel), for Employer 
) BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated July 10, 1991,^ we remanded this matter 
to the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) with instructions that he open and count the ballot 
cast by Mark Sommer. As Sommer's vote could have been 
determinative of the election, we did not decide the challenge 
made by the Mohawk Valley Nursing Home (Employer) to the ballot 
cast by Kristin Markwardt. Sommer's vote makes Markwardt's 
ballot determinative of the election-2^ and it is, therefore, 
necessary pursuant to our earlier decision for us to determine 
her eligibility to vote. 
i/24 PERB 5[3010 (1991) . 
•^The vote as last tallied by the Director after Sommer's 
} ballot was counted stands 42 in favor of representation, 41 
against, with the one remaining challenge to Markwardt's ballot. 
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The stipulated unit in relevant respect includes regular 
part-time employees who work "more than 20 hours per week". The 
parties1 arguments regarding Markwardt's eligibility are based 
strictly upon her time and attendance records. The Employer 
alleges that Markwardt is ineligible because she did not work the 
number of hours required by the parties1 consent agreement. The 
United Food and Commercial Workers, District Union Local 1, 
AFL-CIO (Petitioner) argues to the contrary. 
As requested by the assigned Administrative Law Judge, the 
Employer submitted time records from the payroll period ending 
May 19, 1990, the one immediately preceding the date the petition 
was filed, through August 11, 1990, the payroll period including 
the August 9 ballot count. In summary, these records show that 
in all but one week, when she had no hours worked, Markwardt 
worked a varying number of hours ranging from a low of 10.5 to a 
high of 34.25. Markwardt worked fewer than 20 hours in 7 of the 
13 weeks during this period. 
In the absence of any contrary intent by the parties, we 
believe that their agreement to the appropriate unit should 
reflect the ordinary meaning of the words used. The applicable 
definition of the word "per" means "with respect to every member 
of a specified group or series" or "for each".-3-/ Because 
Markwardt did not work more than 20 hours each week within any 
arguably relevant time period and because we have no evidence 
•^Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1966 ed.) 
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before us of the parties' intent to construe their unit 
definition in any way other than in the ordinary sense of the 
word "per", we find that Markwardt was not in the unit for 
purposes of the election and that she is ineligible to vote. 
For the reasons set forth above, we sustain the Employer's 
challenge to Markwardt's ballot on a finding that she is 
ineligible to vote. Her ballot is, accordingly, void. 
As a majority of the valid votes cast favors representation 
by the Petitioner (42 - 41), the Petitioner is entitled to be 
certified. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Food and Commercial 
Workers, District Union Local 1, AFL-CIO has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the Employer in the 
unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and regular part-time (more 
than 20 hours per week) Licensed Practical 
Nurses, Nurses Aides, Activities Assistants 
and Ward Clerks. 
Excluded: All Registered Nurses, per diem casual or 
seasonal employees, confidential employees, 
guards, supervisors, medical record clerks, 
cooks, diet technicians, dietary aides, 
maintenance workers, housekeepers, laundry 
workers, feeder/transporters and all other 
nursing home employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the Employer shall negotiate 
collectively with the United Food and Commercial Workers, 
District Union Local 1, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
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collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: August 14, 1991 
Albany, New York 
4 T J A t>.y.»^l 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
hut4s^. *.?. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J< Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, NASSAU 
LOCAL 830, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-11754 
-and-
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (STEVEN CRAIN of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
BEE, DeANGELIS & EISMAN (PETER A. BEE of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of 
Nassau (County) to a decision by the Assistant Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director). 
The Assistant Director held that the County violated §209-a.l(d) 
of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
reduced the length of the maximum meal break permitted correction 
officers in the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Nassau Local 830 
(CSEA). 
The stipulated record before the Assistant Director 
establishes that under Warden's Order No. 26-88 the correction 
officers have enjoyed a 4 0-minute maximum meal break since 
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December 1988, which was unilaterally shortened to a 30-minute 
maximum in May 1990. For many years before December 1988, the 
correction officers had a meal period with a maximum duration of 
3 0 minutes. 
The Assistant Director dismissed the County's defense that 
its action was permitted by certain provisions in the parties' 
existing contract, finding, in effect, that its rights to 
regulate work schedules and to determine the methods, means and 
personnel by which its operations are conducted did not encompass 
a right to increase the employees' hours of work. The Assistant 
Director also held that the 17 months during which the unit 
employees had a maximum 40-minute meal period was enough to 
constitute a past practice which could not be changed 
unilaterally. As a remedy, he ordered, inter alia, that the 
County rescind so much of the May 1990 order which set a meal 
period of 30 minutes and restore the meal relief practice as it 
existed under Warden's Order No. 2 6-88. 
The County alleges in its exceptions that we lack subject 
matter jurisdiction over the charge because it alleges a breach 
of contract, that there is no established past practice favoring 
a 40-minute maximum meal period, and that the remedy is overly 
broad in its unqualified restoration of Warden's Order No. 26-88. 
CSEA argues in its response that the Assistant Director's 
decision is correct in all respects. 
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For the reasons which follow, we affirm the Assistant 
Director's finding of a violation of §209-a.l(d), but we modify 
the proposed remedy. 
The charge lies plainly within our jurisdiction because the 
contractual provisions cited by the County are not a reasonably 
arguable source of right to CSEA with respect to the subject 
matter of the charge.^/ The cited contractual provisions may 
be an arguable source of right to the County, but in that 
respect, we agree with the Assistant Director's disposition of 
this contractual waiver defense for the reasons stated in his 
decision.-2-/ 
We similarly affirm the Assistant Director's disposition of 
the alleged unilateral change in practice. As found by the 
Assistant Director, the County's most recent meal break practice 
was unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a period of 
time sufficient under the circumstances^/ to create a 
reasonable expectation among the affected unit employees that the 
4 0-minute maximum meal break would continue. We have no 
^/county of Nassau, 23 PERB f3051 (1990). 
-^/it appears from certain statements in the County's appeal 
papers that the County may have intended to include an exception 
to the Assistant Director's disposition of its claim of 
contractual privilege within its narrow exception to the 
jurisdictional issue. We, therefore, address both the 
jurisdictional issue and the waiver issue. 
^See City of Rochester. 21 PERB [^3045 (1988) , conf 'd, 
155 A.D.2d 1003, 22 PERB }[7035 (4th Dep't 1989) (period of 13 
months sufficient under circumstances to establish exclusivity 
over certain work). 
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hesitancy in affirming the Assistant Director's finding that 
there was an established past practice in the described 
circumstances and, therefore, we have no occasion to consider 
whether lesser circumstances may similarly establish a practice 
insulated from unilateral change. 
The County's exception directed to the proposed remedy 
concerns only that part of the order which requires the County to 
restore Warden's Order No. 26-88, which effected the change to a 
40-minute maximum meal break. The charge is limited to a change 
in the length of the meal period. Warden's Order No. 2 6-88, 
however, covers matters beyond the length of the meal break as 
does the May 1990 order which gave rise to the charge. The 
Assistant Director ordered the County's May 1990 order rescinded 
only insofar as it sets a meal relief period of 3 0 minutes. It 
is consistent with that portion of the remedial order and with 
the scope of the charge as filed and litigated to clarify the 
Assistant Director's order by amending it to require a 
restoration of Warden's Order No. 2 6-88 only insofar as it 
authorizes a 40-minute maximum meal break rather than a 
restoration of that order in its entirety. 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Assistant 
Director's finding that the County violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act, dismiss the exceptions directed to that finding, and grant 
the County's exception directed to the Assistant Director's 
remedial order. 
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THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the County rescind so much of 
Policy No. 21-90 which sets a maximum meal relief period of 30 
minutes; that it restore that part of Warden's Order No. 26-88, 
dated December 12, 1988, and effective December 19, 1988, which 
authorizes a maximum meal relief period of 40 minutes; that it 
make the affected employees whole by paying them their 
contractual rate of pay for each 10 minutes of meal relief time 
lost by virtue of the implementation of Policy No. 21-9 0, with 
interest at the maximum legal rate; and that it sign and post the 
attached notice at all locations normally used to communicate 
information to correction officers. 
DATED: August 14, 1991 
Albany, New York 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Nassau Local 830, that the County of Nassau: 
1. Will rescind so much of Policy No. 21-90 
which sets a maximum meal relief period of 30 
minutes; 
2. Will restore that part of. Warden's Order No. 
2 6-88, dated December 12, 1988, and effective 
December 19, 1988, which authorizes a maximum meal 
relief period of 40 minutes; 
3. Will make the affected employees whole by 
paying them their contractual rate of pay for each 10 
minutes of meal relief time lost by virtue of the 
implementation of Policy No. 21-9 0, with interest at 
the maximum legal rate. 
COUNTY OF NASSAU 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the 
YONKERS NON-TEACHING UNIT, LOCAL 860, 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and 
LOCAL 8 60, CIVIL SERVI.CE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, CASE NO. D-0247 
AFL-CIO and CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
Respondents, 
upon the Charge of Violation of 
§210.1 of the Civil Service Law 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On August 29, 1990, John M. Crotty, this agency's Counsel, 
filed a charge alleging that the Yonkers Non-Teaching Unit, Local 
860, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO and Local 860, Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO had 
violated Civil Service Law (CSL) §210.1 in that they caused, 
instigated, encouraged or condoned a strike against the Yonkers 
City School District on June 1 and June 4, 1990. 
The charge further alleged that of the 1,060 employees in 
the negotiating unit, 1,060 employees participated in the strike. 
Case No. D-0247 -2 
The Respondents requested Counsel to indicate the penalty he 
would be willing to recommend to this Board as appropriate for 
the violation charged. Counsel proposed a penalty of the loss of 
Respondents * right to have dues and agency shop fee deduction 
privileges to the extent of twenty-five percent (25%) of the 
amount which would otherwise be deducted during a year.-i/ 
Upon the understanding that Counsel would recommend and this 
Board would accept that penalty, the Respondents withdrew their 
answer to the charge. Counsel has so recommended. We determine 
that the recommended penalty is a reasonable one and will 
effectuate the policies of the Act. 
WE ORDER that the dues and agency shop fee deduction rights 
of the Yonkers Non-Teaching Unit, Local 860, Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and 
Local 860, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO and Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO be suspended, commencing on the first 
practicable date, and continuing for such period of time during 
which twenty-five percent (25%) of their annual agency shop fees, 
if any, and dues would otherwise be deducted. Thereafter, no 
•i/This penalty is based upon the conduct of Yonkers Non-
Teaching Unit, Local 860, Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and is intended to be the 
equivalent of a three-month suspension of privileges of dues and 
agency shop fee deductions, if any, if such were withheld in 
twelve monthly installments. 
Case No. D-0247 -3 
dues or agency shop fees shall be deducted on their behalf by the 
Yonkers City School District until the Respondents affirm that 
they no longer assert the right to strike against any government 
as required by the provisions of CSL §210.3(g). 
DATED: August 14, 1991 
Albany, New York 
^Jb7 JuJl 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
AuiuAz. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ALBANY AIRPORT PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 3337, IAFF, AFL-CIO-CLC, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3795 
COUNTY OF ALBANY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Albany Airport Professional 
Firefighters Association, Local 3337, IAFF, AFL-CIO-CLC has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-3795 
- 2 
Unit: Included: Albany County Airport aircraft rescue 
firefighters, including crew chiefs. 
Excluded: Chief of the fire department and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall..negotiate collectively with the Albany Airport .Professional. 
Firefighters Association, Local 3337, IAFF, AFL-CIO-CLC. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 14, 1991 
Albany, New York 
f/L\C^%K\Mulvt* 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membefr 
Eric J. Schmertz, Memb 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND 
HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-3805 
TOWN OF DOVER, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees* Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
) 
Certification - C-3805 - 2 
Unit: Included: Foreman, Mechanic, Heavy Equipment Operator, 
Driver and Laborer. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers o 
America, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 14, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kmsella, cnai h rperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Schmertz, Membar 
#3C-8/14/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 317, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OP TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3825 
TOWN OF NEW HAVEN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 317, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-3825 
- 2 -
Unit: Included: Motor Equipment Operators, 
Excluded: All Clerical, Personnel, Office Personnel, 
Guards and Supervisors. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 317, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party'. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: August 14, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chai lrperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J. Schmertz, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
5 0 WOLF ROAD 
ALBANY. NEW YORK 1 2 2 0 5 - 2 6 7 0 
August 14, 1991 
Marvin E. Johnson 
1221 Smith Village Road 
Silver Springs, MD 20904 
Dear Mr. Johnson: 
I am pleased to inform you that the Board at its August 
meeting appointed you to its grievance arbitration panel. 
Consistent with our discussions and agreements at the July 16 
meeting at the Rochester office of the Division, please copy me 
on your withdrawal of case 6-B-R-88-129033. 
Very truly yours 
JMC:cw 
cc: Forest Cummings, 
Pauline Kinsellai 
Richard Curreri 
Jr. 
J 
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MARVIN E. J O H N S O N ACCORMEND ASSOCIATES 
,-ONFLICT RESOLUTION SERVICES 
(716) 4 8 2 - 2 8 5 7 "NT 49 ALVORD STREET ROCHESTER, NY 14609 
SEP 5 1991 
CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE 
August 26, 1991 
Forest Cummings, Jr. 
Regional Director 
N.Y. State Division of Human Rights 
25 9 Monroe Avenue 
Rochester, New York 14 607 
Re: Johnson- v. PERB 
Case No. 6-B-R-88-129033 
Dear Mr. Cummings: 
By letter dated August 14, 1991, John M. Crotty, Deputy 
Chairman and Counsel for the New York State PERB, informed 
me that the PERB appointed me to its grievance arbitration 
panel. 
Persuant to my agreement with Mr. Crotty and Executive 
Director Rosemarie V. Rosen, representatives for the PERB, 
I hereby withdraw my complaint in the above referenced case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Marvin E ^ xTohnson 
Mediator/Arbitrator 
cc: John M. Crotty 
W-V.S. pug:,,. .... 
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